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ABSTRACT 
Almost every year, for the past three decades, the number of private prisons in the United 
States has grown. These private correctional institutions are advertised as effective ways for the 
government to cut costs and manage the high incarceration rates in the United States.  However, 
despite these claims, the effectiveness of private prisons has been under increased scrutiny by 
human rights groups and American citizens. This paper examines whether or not private prisons 
are effective at reducing crime. My statistical analysis suggests that private prisons are actually 
ineffective at rehabilitating prisoners. These results question the implementation of private 
prisons across the United States, because if they are not effectively reforming prisoners or 
reducing crime, the price of privatization may be too high.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Headlines documenting justice reform and calling for change are becoming familiar. In 
the fall of 2015, the front page of the New York Times showcased covers ranging from “U.S. to 
Begin Freeing 6,000 From Prisons,1” to “A ‘Privatization of the Justice System.2’” Sometimes 
the front page documented social change, describing something like, “Police Leaders Join Call to 
Cut Prison Rosters,3” and others times the cover offered something like, “A New Look at Sex 
Offenders and Lockups that Never End.4” Even during Pope Francis’ visit to the United States 
the Times’ headlines read, “Pope Departs After Showing a Deft Touch” underneath a cover 
photo of the pope shaking hands with prisoners in Philadelphia.5 Political candidates for the 2016 
presidential race are practically required to take a stance on justice reform and people are 
becoming more outspoken every day. The debatable outcomes from the “tough on crime” era, 
accusations of structural discrimination and increased privatization have only fueled skepticism 
from the American people. The authors of Prisons in the Americas in the Twentieth Century: A 
Human Dumping Ground remind us that the seven basic principles of the American Correction 
Association (ACA) are humanity, justice, protection, opportunity, knowledge, competence, and 
accountability;6 but recently, there has been a lot of debate over the adherence to these 
principles. The justice system is under scrutiny and the future of crime policy is uncertain.  
One of the most contentious issues lately has been the emergence of private correctional 
institutions. Correctional institutions, by definition, should correct the behavior of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 C. J. Chivers, "U.S. to Begin Freeing 6,000 From Prisons," The New York Times, October 7, 2015, 
2 Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Michael Corkery, "A 'Privatization of the Justice System,'" The New York Times, 
November 2, 2015, 
3 Timothy Williams, "Police Leaders Join Call to Cut Prison Rosters," The New York Times, October 21, 2015 
4 Monica Davey, "A New Look at Sex Offenders and Lockups that Never End," The New York Times, October 30, 
2015 
5 Jim Yardley and Laurie Goodstein, "Pope Departs, after Showing a Deft Touch," The New York Times, September 
29, 2015, 
6 Jonathan D. Rosen and Marten W. Breinen, Security in the Americas in the Twenty-First Century : Prisons in the 
Americas in the Twenty-First Century : A Human Dumping Ground (n.p.: n.p., 2015) 
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individuals, and private correctional institutions should be no different. However, private prisons 
make money when people are in prison, so providing correctional and rehabilitation services is 
inherently against their interest. The concern is that prisoners from private prisoners are more 
likely to reoffend and return to prison because private prisons have an incentive not to provide 
strong reentry programs. The question before us is whether or not private prisons are more or 
less effective than public prisons at reforming prisoners. Through the careful analysis of crime 
rates, incarceration rates, and private prison data, I have investigated the paradoxical role of 
private prisons in the United States and examined whether or not they are effective institutions.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
An International Incarceration Comparison 
In 2014, over 1.5 million people were incarcerated in both federal and state prisons in the 
United States7 and it is becoming common knowledge that the United States has the highest 
incarceration rate in the world. Roy Wamlsley’s report for the International Centre for Prison 
Studies showcases the significant disparity between the incarceration rates in the United States 
and in every other nation.8 According to this report, for every 100,000 people in the United 
States, 716 are incarcerated. This figure, which is based on US Census information from 2011, 
actually signals a decrease in the United States incarceration rate. In 2009, for example, the 
number was 743 for every hundred thousand.9 Despite the recent decrease, the fact remains that 
the United States leads the world in per capita incarceration rates by a significant margin, 
especially compared to other industrialized nations.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 E. Ann Carson, Prisons in 2014 (Washington DC: US Department of Justice, 2015) 
8 Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (London: International Centre for Prison Studies, 2013) 
9 Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (Tenth Edition) (London: International Centre for Prison Studies, 
2013) 
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Walmsely’s report explains that almost half of the world’s prisoners are housed in the 
United States, Russia and China. No countries, except for the Seychelles (709) and St. Kitts 
(714), come close to the per-capita prison population rate in the United States.10 Many theorists 
have attempted explain why US prisons house so many people. While it is clear that the United 
States incarcerates far more people per capita than any other industrialized nation, there is a lot 
of debate over why this happens and whether it is necessary. Many people attribute the mass 
incarceration to strict public policy. Others cite social causes such as the education gap, the 
prison-pipeline or recidivism.  
In this paper, I will briefly address a few of the theories for high incarceration rates, 
paying particularly close attention to the reasons why people are staying in US prisons for so 
long and whether or not the US incarceration system is effective at reforming prisoners. 
Specifically, this project investigates whether or not private prisons are an effective strategy for 
the US corrections system.   
Over the last few decades, the United States has been one of only eleven countries in the 
world to engage in prison privatization. In fact, the United States holds more people in private 
prisons than any other country in the world.11 Around the world, one of the most common uses 
of private prisons is for the detention of immigrants. In the UK, 73 percent of immigrant 
detainees are held privately and Australia has instituted a wholly privatized immigrant detention 
system.12 There is serious concern worldwide from individuals and human rights groups about 
the problems with for-profit incarceration systems. Concerns vary from substandard care to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Ibid. 
11Cody Mason, International Growth Trends in Prison Privatization (Washington, DC: Sentencing Project, 2013). 
12 ibid.  
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inadequate conditions and the incentive for higher rates of imprisonment in order to maximize 
profits.13  
Recent History of US Crime and Policy  
As we have discussed, stories about mass incarceration rates and the broken judicial 
system were very prevalent in 2015. This is, in part, because public opinion on the matter seems 
to be changing and people are more interested in discussing the problems with the justice system. 
The Peter D Hart Research Institute has documented that, since the 1990’s, public 
opinion has become less supportive of strict enforcement and sentencing policies14. Instead, 
people are becoming more supportive of reallocating government money toward rehabilitation 
services, reentry services and programs that target the root of crime.15 An opinion poll conducted 
by the Opportunity Agenda, a criminal justice advocacy group based in New York, shows that in 
particular, people seem to favor rehabilitation and treatment services for those convicted of low-
level drug crimes.16 While opinion polls do not always accurately reflect true public opinion due 
to potential issues such as survey bias or sampling errors, these results still suggest that the 
public opinion is shifting.  
Despite public dissatisfaction with high incarceration rates, US incarceration numbers 
have continued to increase over the last few decades. Figure 1 demonstrates the dramatic 
increase in the total number of people incarcerated and the incarceration rates across the United 
States. The y-axis on the left and the corresponding black line show the total number of people 
detained in the US justice system. The y-axis on the right and the dotted line show the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Lana Nassar, Human Rights Implications of Private Prisons (Berkeley, CA: Human Rights Advocates, 2013). 
14 Peter D Research Institute Hart, Inc, Changing Public Attitudes toward the Criminal Justice System (n.p.: Open 
Society Institute, 2002) 
15  Ibid. 
16 An Overview of Public Opinion and Discourse on Criminal Justice Issues (New York, NY: Opportunity Agenda, 
2014), 
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incarceration rate per 100,00 people. Visually, there is a very clear relationship between these 
two lines. Not until recently have the incarceration rates begun to plateau. 
 
As pictured in Figure 1, incarceration rates have grown so rapidly that it appears as if 
there must be an incentive to keep people in prisons because, even as crime rates drop, the 
incarceration rate has continued to rise. In the wake of sweeping crime policy changes in the 90s, 
the United States experienced a dramatic decrease in crime.17 Many people, including the 
Clinton administration, attributed this drop in crime rates to the changes in public policy. Stevin 
Levitt, one of the coauthors of Freakenomics, and a professor at the University of Chicago, 
postulates that the decline in crime across the United States is largely due to increases in the 
number of police, the rising prison population, the waning crack epidemic, and the legalization 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Alan J. Beck and Paige M. Harrison, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 2000 
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of abortion.18 He also explains that some of the most commonly cited reasons for the decrease in 
crime, such as changing demographics, gun control laws, and increased use of the death penalty 
had little direct role on the decline in crime. 
In the past, the costs of maintaining prisons might have been an effective deterrent to 
high incarceration rates, but in the last few decades, fewer prisons are under state control. While 
most people would agree that keeping a person in prison limits their ability to commit crimes, 
this strategy only works as long as that person remains incarcerated.  It is costly to keep so many 
people behind bars, so in theory, it would be in the best financial interest of the government to 
keep people out of prisons, particularly because the government is not making money by keeping 
prisoners in prison, it is losing money.  
To cut spending, the government has been outsourcing to private, for-profit contractors to 
help cut costs. Unlike the government, these for-profit firms benefit when inmates stay behind 
bars. This policy shift has raised some very serious concerns about our justice system. Before we 
delve into the specific role of private prisons in society, it is important to understand how prisons 
work and the services that they provide.   
Recidivism and Re-Entry Programs 
One potential solution to the problem of high incarceration rates would be for prisons to 
provide quality re-entry services so that people leaving prison are less likely to reoffend. 
However, the paradox of private prisons is that offering quality reentry services would be against 
their interest because it would lower incarceration rates.  
High recidivism rates are clear cause of mass incarceration in the United States. Once a 
person is released from his or her sentence, he or she is very likely to re-offend. According to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18  Steven D. Levitt, "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six 
that Do Not," Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 1 (Winter 2004) 
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US Department of Justice, about two thirds of released prisoners were arrested for a new crime 
within 3 years, and three quarters were arrested within five years.19  This is a very sobering 
statistic, because, in theory, it implies that correctional facilities are not doing an adequate job 
correcting behavior. This reality impacts a very large number of people, particularly people of 
color. In 2001, 4.3 million Americans were former prisoners.20 
Rather than concluding that prisoners are predisposed to reoffend, there is increasing 
evidence to support the hypothesis that prisons are failing to support their inmates. Essentially, 
this hypothesis suggests that the issue is not prisoners who want to reoffend, or people who are 
inherently criminal; the issue is that prisons themselves are not helping former inmates develop 
the necessary skills to stay out of prison. The conclusion to this hypothesis is that high 
recidivism rates indicate that the prisons are failing their mandate as “correctional” facilities.  
In an effort to reduce recidivism, prisons are required to provide support to inmates to 
help with the transition into the free world. All prisons are required to offer at least basic reentry 
services, even private prisons. These reentry services vary significantly from state to state, prison 
to prison and inmate to inmate. The most basic re-entry service that prisons offer is education, 
particularly in youth prisons. There is very strong evidence that there is a causal relationship 
between education programs and successful reentry into society.21 Additionally, the costs of 
education are usually very small compared to the other costs of incarceration. 
Boston University is one of the few universities to offer college courses to inmates.  BU 
holds university courses for both men and women behind bars as an extension of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19  Matthew R. Durose, Alexia D. Cooper, and Howard N. Snyder, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 
2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010 (Washington DC: US Department of Justice, 2014) 
20 Thomas B. Bonczar, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. 
Population, 1974-2001 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2003) 
21Lois M. Davis et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of Correctional Education (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation, 2013). 
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metropolitan college.22 Sadly, these programs are rare, in part because the financial burden often 
falls on the university.  However, programs such as these can be incredibly important.  A study 
by the RAND Corporation concludes that inmates who participate in correctional education 
programs had 43 percent lower odds of recidivating.23 Since there is such strong evidence that 
correctional programs are a very effective way to reduce recidivism, one potential strategy to 
reduce crime would be to enhance these programs to keep people from return to prison. 
It is very well documented that education and success are intimately related and that a 
poor education greatly increases a person’s chances of incarceration. These issues become even 
more relevant when we examine the education statistics of inmates. In 2004, around 36 percent 
of the individuals in state prisons had not completed high school. This is almost twice the 
national average of 19 percent.24 For this reason, weaknesses in the education system are often 
referred to as the school-to-prison pipeline due to the fact that failing schools are funneling 
students into prison. However, these inmates do not only lack education in the formal sense, they 
regularly lack vocational skills or job experience. It follows logically that without an education, 
and without vocational skills, many of these inmates are primed to reoffend, primarily because 
without an education it is very hard to find a job and very hard to support oneself.   
The quality of re-entry programs appears to be more significant than a person’s length of 
time in prison when it comes to finding employment in the free world. A study done by Jeffrey 
Kling on behalf of The Brookings Institute, and published in the American Economic Review 
found no consistent evidence of adverse labor market consequences for people who were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 "Prison Education Program," Boston University, http://sites.bu.edu/pep/. 
23 Lois M. Davis et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of Correctional Education: A Meta-Analysis of Programs That 
Provide Education to Incarcerated Adults (n.p.: Rand, 2013) 
24 Ibid. 
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incarcerated for longer periods of time. 25  However, in general, people who have been 
incarcerated have a much harder time finding employment than those who never spend time 
behind bars26. The goal of re-entry programs is to attempt to ease this challenge, but the 
effectiveness of re-entry programs varies significantly. For this reason, many people who call for 
prison reform have been particularly critical of re-entry programs.  
The Emergence of Private Prisons 
The emergence of private prisons and for profit correctional facilities has added a new 
variable to the debate over punitive policy and the role of prisons in society. An article entitled 
“How for-profit prisons have become the biggest lobby no one is talking about,” published in the 
Washington Post during the spring of 2015 attempted to expose the private prison industry, 
claiming that these companies are quietly lobbying the government and making money at the 
expense of the American people.27 It is certainly true that the prevalence of private prisons has 
grown significantly in the last few decades, and it is also true that there is not a lot of literature 
on their lobbying efforts. However, as activists such as Bruce Western, Michelle Alexander and 
Inimai Chettiar begin to gain more recognition, the issue of prisons, and the broad impact that 
they have on the community, is becoming very topical.  
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the dramatic rise in private prisons across the United States and 
the increased percentage of prisoners that are housed in private institutions. Not only have 
private prisons grown, but also the percentage of prisoners in private prisons continues to grow 
as states continue to rely on privatization as an option for criminal justice.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Jeffrey R. Kling, "Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings," American Economic Review, January 2006 
26 Shadd Maruna and Russell Immarigeon, After Crime and Punishment: Pathways to Offender Reintegration 
(Portland, OR: Willian Publishing, 2004) 
27 Michael Cohen, "How For-Profit Prisons Have Become the Biggest Lobby No One is Talking About," 
Washington Post (Washington DC), April 28, 2015 
Clark-Clough 11 
 
The services that private prisons offer vary greatly in society.  Sometimes, cities or local 
municipalities contract with private companies to build city jails for people awaiting trial, or just 
recently arrested. In this case, there is probably not much variation between private and public 
prisons because the facility its self is a temporary location for prisoners. Perhaps the most 
common example of privatization in the prison industry has been their use in the detention and 
transfer of criminal aliens. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency has contracted 
with the major private prison corporations to build and/or operate many of its transitional 
facilities.  
A primary concern with private prisons is the level of influence that they have in the 
government.  In the last few decades, private prisons have been lobbying in Congress, at the state 
level and at the local level. Lobbying can include anything from petitioning the government for 
contracts to supporting tough crime laws in order to maintain high incarceration rates. For 
example, in a comparative analysis of the UK and the USA, Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn 
found that the American Legislative Exchange Counsel (ALEC), a conservative public policy 
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group, has been very active in promoting harsher sentencing and pro-privatization policies.28 
This is significant because, as the article tells us, 70 percent of the ALEC is funded by corporate 
donations, including contributions from the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the 
largest private corrections company in the United States.  
Sometimes contributions from private prisons are direct and sometimes, private prisons 
companies will funnel money toward lawmakers to indirectly support stricter sentencing or 
tougher enforcement. One highly publicized example of private prison corruption occurred in 
Pennsylvania in 2010. This case is sometimes referred to as the “Kids for Cash” scandal because 
a Judge in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania was found guilty of racketeering and corruption after 
receiving bribes from a private prison company to sentence juveniles to prison in an affiliated 
private facility. The amount totaled around $1 million and the crimes ranged from possession of 
drug paraphilia to stealing a jar of nutmeg and posting web page spoofs of an assistant 
principal.29 All of these juveniles received prison sentences and were sent to a private prison 
owned by the same people who were paying the judge.  Stories like this one have raised doubts 
about private prisons across the United States.  
The rise of private prisons seems to have corresponded with the “tough on crime” years. 
However, now that there is a growing call to reduce the inmate population, their place in the 
United States is being called into question. Another article in the Washington Post, published in 
2014, explains that we have surprisingly little information about the quality and performance of 
private prisons.30 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, "Comparative Criminal Justice Policy-Making in the United States and the 
United Kingdom," British Journal of Criminology 45, no. 1 (2005) 
29 Walter Palvo, "Pennsylvania Judge Gets 'Life Sentence' For Prison Kickback Scheme," Forbes, August 12, 2011. 
30 Sasha Volokh, "Are Private Prisons Better or Worse than Public Prisons?," Washington Post (Washington DC), 
February 25, 2015 
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As we evaluate the role of private prisons, one very important consideration is to examine 
their effectiveness, particularly relating to reentry and recidivism rates. The paradox of private 
prisons is that they profit when people are incarcerated, but theoretically, correctional facilities 
are designed to prep inmates for reentry into the free world. Practically, it would be in the best 
economic interest of a private prison for a person to reoffend because then they would return to 
prison and the private company would profit. While this makes sense in theory, the question is 
whether this happens in reality. This consideration leads us to following the question: are 
recidivism rates higher among inmates that were formally housed in private prisons? 
Andrew Spivak of the University of Nevada, and Susan Sharp of the University of 
Oklahoma published an article in the Crime & Delinquency journal that examines this question 
of post release performance from private prisons. The article explains that the then-existing 
empirical evidence to answer this question was limited to only four studies, and all of them were 
done in Florida. Their analysis evaluates private prisons in Oklahoma, and unlike the preceding 
studies, Spivak and Sharp’s findings were significant and suggested that private prison inmates 
have a greater hazard of recidivism.31 
Spivak and Sharp obtained their data from the Oklahoma Department of Corrections and 
used a Cox proportional hazards survival regression analysis to evaluate recidivism. The survival 
analysis allows for Spivak and Sharp to account for multiple dependent variables and account for 
hazard in the regression. The findings of this study were unique, because the previous studies 
had actually found lower recidivism rates among private prison inmates.32 This study, however, 
demonstrates a significantly greater hazard of re-offense for prisoners in private prisons. 
Specifically, longer time spent in private prisons indicates an increase in the hazard of recidivism !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Andrew L. Spivak and Susan F. Sharp, "Inmate Recidivism as a Measure of Private Prison Performance," Crime 
& Delinquency 54, no. 3 (July 2008) 
32 Ibid. 
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while longer time spent in public prisons indicates a decrease in the hazard. In the conclusions of 
their study, Spivak and Sharp caution readers on their interpretation of these findings due to the 
possibility of many confounding variables. Notably, the demographics of prisoners in private 
prisons in Oklahoma were younger, had shorter sentences, were more likely to have drug 
offenses and more likely to be released on probation. All of these factors can complicate the 
regression results, so in my analysis I was very careful to control for these factors as much as 
possible. 
Since Spivak and Sharp completed their study, a number of articles have been published 
examining this question in other states. Grant Duwe and Valarie Clark published an article more 
recently in the Criminal Justice Review that examined the post release performance of inmates in 
Minnesota. Their findings too suggest that the private prisons are not more effective in lowering 
recidivism rates.33 Specifically, Duwe and Clark’s analysis shows that prisoners from private 
prisons are associated with a greater risk of recidivism across 20 different regression Cox 
models. However, the article also explains that evidence on this subject has been mixed and 
seems to vary depending on the state and the research methods. For Example, Duwe and Clark’s 
analysis directly conflicts with Spivak and Sharp despite the fact that they both attempt to isolate 
the same causal relationship. With such varying results, and conflicting data, this question clearly 
requires more research, and the effectiveness of private prisons remains debatable.  
OPERATIONALIZATION 
Project Design 
As we have discussed, there is an inherent paradox in the service that private prisons 
provide because they are required to offer reentry services to inmates, but the companies profit !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Grant Duwe and Valarie Clark, "The Effects of Private Prison Confinement on Offender Recidivism: Evidence 
from Minnesota," Criminal Justice Review 38, no. 3 (2013) 
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from higher incarceration rates. Therefore, the general hypothesis is that private prisons will be 
less effective than public prisons. In theory, the data collection and analysis in this project should 
examine the success of private prisons by comparing the re-offense rates of prisoners from both 
private and public prisons. Another way to approach the hypothesis might be to examine the 
crime rates in areas that have private prisons and compare that data against areas without private 
prisons. 
Ideally, this project would focus on the individual successes of people who have been 
released from private prisons compared to individuals released from state-run prisons. These 
individuals would be studied as two distinct groups of people: those who had served time in a 
public prison and those who had served time in a private prison. Once individuals had been 
categorized accordingly, the data would trace the rate of recidivism in each group over the next 
few years.  After an interval of time, generally five years, each group would have a distinct 
collective re-offense record.  Analysis of this re-offense record would help to measure the 
success of public versus private prisons. If the data showed that prisoners from private prisons 
tended to reoffend at higher rates than prisoners from public prisons, the hypothesis would be 
correct.    
In this scenario, certain controls, such as the types of crimes and length of prison 
sentences would be essential for accurate findings. For example, an effective case study might 
include individuals from both private and public prisons who had committed violent crimes in 
the state of Arizona and had served sentences between five and ten years. This data would show 
whether or not the individuals who had served their sentences in private prisons had higher 
recidivism rates than their peers who had served time in public prisons. Another option would be 
to include length of sentences in a private prison as a control. If people who served longer 
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sentences in private prisons had higher recidivism rates, it might challenge the long-term 
consequences of a sentence in a private prison versus a public prison.  
Unfortunately these data are not available. There has been research on recidivism in the 
United States, but the data available do not help answer this question. Just recently, in 2015, the 
US Department of Justice released a recidivism report that traced the criminal history patterns or 
prisoners released in 30 different US states. This report demonstrates striking results that indicate 
that the recidivism rate in the first five years after releases from prison has risen to 77 percent in 
the United States.34 However, the data is mostly general data on recidivism and does not account 
for the public or private ownership of the correctional facilities so the 2015 study does very little 
to address this hypothesis.  
In the absence of direct data that catalogues the recidivism of prisoners from public and 
private prisoners, we turn to alternative dependent and independent variables. Rather than focus 
on individual offenders and individual crimes, we can instead focus on private prisons and 
overall crime rates. Recall the initial hypothesis that private prisons are less effective at 
correcting the behavior than public prisons. If this is true, then the crime rates in jurisdictions 
with private prisons should be comparatively higher. Essentially, higher recidivism rates will 
also mean higher overall crime rates.  Notably, this is a tricky relationship to measure because 
there are possibly countless confounding variables. Just because a jurisdiction with a private 
prison has a higher crime rate than a jurisdiction without one does not necessarily implicate the 
private prison. For this reason, comparing states or counties with private prisons to states or 
counties without private prisons will not necessarily tell us what we want to know.  Instead, it is 
more effective to compare jurisdictions against themselves.  This means examining crime rates in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Matthew R. Durose, Alexia D. Cooper, and Howard N. Snyder, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 
2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010 (Washington DC: US Department of Justice, 2014). 
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jurisdictions before they build a private prison and comparing the crime rates after the private 
prison has been built.  
As we have discussed, crime rates have been declining across the United States since the 
1980s, so simply because crime rates are lower after the construction of a private prison does not 
necessarily tell us that private prison are more effective. Year fixed effects can help account for 
aggregate change across all districts and states, such as cultural or legal changes, that are not 
necessarily related to the construction and implementation of private prisons.  
The final step before collecting actual data on private prisons was to determine what 
jurisdictional level might be the most effective. Private prisons exist across the country, but their 
physical location does not always tell us everything about the demographics of their inmates.  
The choice lies between whether to analyze private prisons and crime rates at the county level or 
at the state level. Police and law enforcement is usually handled at the city or county level, but 
prisons are usually administered at the state level. A person may commit a crime in one county 
and then be incarcerated in a different one, but this person rarely moves across state lines. 
Therefore, the most effective level of prison analysis is at the state level. The three most notable 
exceptions to state-level prison administration are the US Marshalls service, the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Agency, and a collection of federal prisons. All three of these categories 
of private prisons were ultimately excluded from the analysis and the rationale behind these 
exclusions is outlined in the following pages. 
Private Prison Data Collection 
The first step in data collection was to locate and categorize all of the private prisons in 
the United States. Because the project analyzes the consequences of private prisons after they 
have been built, it is also necessary to record the year that each private prison opened or was 
Clark-Clough 18 
privatized. Unfortunately, the justice department does not have a condensed list of US private 
prisons. Due to the inherently private nature of private prisons, their information is noticeably 
more restricted than their public counterparts. Therefore, in order to create a complete dataset, 
the information and statistics used in this project originate from a wide variety of sources.  
The data about the private prisons comes primarily from the companies themselves, but 
sometimes, public records, individual crime enforcement jurisdictions, the Department of Justice 
and news articles helped to complete the dataset. Over the years, many private prison companies 
have emerged in the United States; but because they are competitive companies, most of them 
have merged with one another. The result has been the emergence of a few very large agencies. 
Today, there are three companies that own and operate the majority of the private prisons in the 
United States: Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), Management and Training 
Corporation (MTC) and the GEO Group Inc. CCA, MTC and GEO were founded in 1983, 1981 
and 198435 respectively.   
Due to their relative monopoly in the private corrections market, this project focuses 
specifically on the corrections facilities run by these three corporations. Sometimes, companies 
retain their original names after a merger but they are under the same management. For example, 
in 2015 CCA acquired Avalon Correctional Services,36 but despite the acquisition, the Avalon 
facilities still have their original names. Whenever this was the case, the data for this project 
categorizes the facility according to its parent corporation.  
Each company publishes the locations of every facility they operate on their webpage, but 
some facilities are not relevant to the analysis of this project. We will discuss which facilities 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 The years that each private prison was founded are all available on the corporate websites: "About CCA," 
Corrections Corporation of America. "Overview & Mission," Management & Training Corporation. "About Us," 
The Geo Group Inc., http://www.geogroup.com/about_us. 
36 "CCA Announces Acquisition of Avalon Correctional Services, Inc.," Global Newswire, October 29, 2015, 
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were excluded, but initially every facility was added to the dataset. The complete private prison 
dataset includes the name of the facility, the customer for the facility, the exact location of the 
prison, the year it opened, the total capacity, the sex of the inmates, the parent corporation and 
the facilities accreditations. The customer of the facility refers to the jurisdiction that licensed the 
contract for a private prison. For example, the customer could be The Arizona Department of 
Corrections, the US Marshall’s service or a local municipality.  
Whenever this information was available on the corporate website, it was included in the 
matrix. However, in some cases, not all the necessary information was available for a particular 
facility. Whenever this was the case, other sources filled holes in the data. The departments of 
justice for individual states provided a lot of missing information and in other cases the 
information was more difficult to find. A complete list of the private prisons in the United States 
is available in Appendix 1. The appendix includes all of the sources consulted in the compilation 
of the dataset. Whenever an observation originates from somewhere other than the corporate 
website, it is indicated with a footnote. Many of the facilities were omitted from the statistical 
analysis and these facilities are shaded in the appendix. 
Facilities were omitted from the analysis whenever their services were not directly 
relevant to this hypothesis. This project focuses on the impact of private prisons on the crime 
rates at the state level. The most commonly excluded facilities were those contracted by the US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE).  ICE detention facilities deal specifically 
with immigrant and alien transport. Specifically, ICE “identifies and apprehends removable 
aliens, detains these individuals when necessary and removes illegal aliens from the United 
States.”37 Prisoners held in ICE facilities rarely renter the community because they are deported. 
Since these facilities are transitional holding facilities rather than correctional institutions, they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 "Enforcement and Removal Operations," US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, https://www.ice.gov/ero. 
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are not related to this hypothesis, which focuses on the effectiveness of private correctional 
institutions. In many cases, the private prison corporate website indicated that the facility was 
under ICE contract. This information was corroborated and supplemented with data from the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency itself, which provides the locations of its 
detention centers on its website.38 
Facilities under contract by the US Marshal Service were excluded from the analysis for a 
similar reason. The US Marshals house and transport prisoners until they are either acquitted or 
convicted.39 Once convicted, US Marshals prisoners are transferred to a federal prison to serve 
their sentence. Therefore, US Marshals facilities are very similar to ICE facilities because their 
primary function is temporary detainment and prisoner transport. 
Aside from ICE and US Marshals facilities, city jails, leased facilities, vacant facilities 
and halfway houses were also omitted from the analysis. A few cities contract with private 
corrections companies for their city jails, but a city jail is also a temporary holding facility for 
people either waiting for transfer to another facility or acquittal. Vacant facilities and leased 
facilities were omitted because they either house no prisoners or are privately owned facilities 
that are operated by the state. Facilities are only relevant to this analysis if they are operated by 
private corporations, therefore those private facilities that are still operated by the state or other 
municipalities are not relevant. Privately run halfway houses were the last group of facilities that 
were not included because they often house a very small number of clients for a very brief period 
of time. While their function is directly related to corrections, halfway houses have a different 
mission than prisons and are generally transitional facilities.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 "Detention Facility Locator," US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, https://www.ice.gov/detention-
facilities#wcm-survey-target-id. 
39 "Defendants in Custody and Prisoner Management," US Marshals Service, http://www.usmarshals.gov/prisoner/. 
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All Corrections Corporation of America facilities were included in the original list of 
prisons, but the GEO Group and Management and Training Corp have services that are not 
correctional. Information on these facilities was never recorded for this project. Specifically, 
GEO divides US facilities into two categories: corrections and community. Correctional facilities 
have all been recorded, but the GEO-community facilities include mental health, reentry 
programs, and drug rehabilitation facilities. These facilities were not included in this project 
because they are largely transitional and the data is much less concrete due to the fast turnover. 
Both GEO and MTC have an international presence and those facilities are not pertinent to this 
project. MTC also runs a Job Corps program that provides education and training to young 
people across the country.40 This program is independent of the justice system so it was not 
incorporated. 
Overall, after all the data collection and categorical exclusions of certain types of 
facilities, only 17 states have relevant private prisons. However, all 50 states have complete data 
in the dataset and therefore, the dataset is strongly balanced. 
Crime Data Collection 
After organizing the number of facilities down to a relevant and usable list of 
observations, the information was merged with state-level crime data. Recall that private prisons 
have been recorded at the state level, so state-level crime data fits neatly into the analysis. The 
crime data used in this analysis comes directly from the US Department of Justice. The 
Department of Justice has created a database of crime statistics that are publically available via 
the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program.41 Specifically, the UCR program holds statistics 
on both violent crimes and property crimes. Violent crime includes murder and non-negligent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 "Job Corps Overview," Management and Training Corporation, https://www.mtctrains.com/education-
training/job-corps-overview. 
41 "Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics," US Department of Justice, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/index.cfm. 
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homicide, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault. Property crime includes 
burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. Arson is notably missing from the list of crime 
statistics available from the Uniform Crime Reporting program.   
The UCR program offers data that is organized either by specific offense, locality or by 
year. This project includes property crimes and violent crimes. These two crime categories 
represent the majority of sentences that are served in U.S. private prisons. This analysis does not 
include crimes related to the possession or distribution of narcotics because data on drug crimes 
is much more difficult to isolate. In the case that a drug crime leads to a violent crime or property 
crime, the property or violent crime is reflected in the data.  
The relevant crime data is aggregated to the state level and then organized by year with 
the first observations from 1980 and the most recent available from 2012. For each of the 33 
years, crime data is available for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The final matrix 
includes: the raw number of crimes committed in each state by year, the population of each state, 
and the crime rates per 100,000 people. Crime rates were measured in three categories: total 
property crime, total violent crime, and a composite of total crime.   
In addition to the information on private prisons and the state-level crime data, the third 
component of data organization involved the collection of total prison populations in each state 
from 1980 through 2012. Total prison populations include both public and private prisons and 
the data comes from annual reports by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.42  This same data was 
reported in a much more accessible format by the Sentencing Project.43 The actual data points in 
this project come from the Sentencing Project’s publication, but I also corroborated the numbers 
against the Bureau of Justice Statistics to ensure that the data are accurate.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 "Publications & Products: Prisoners." Bureau of Justice Statistics.  
     http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=40. 
43 "The Sentencing Project Interactive Map," The Sentencing Project, http://sentencingproject.org/map/map.cfm. 
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Each year, the Bureau of Justice Statistics publishes a report that summarizes the number 
of prisoners in each state and contains demographic information about US prisons. Since private 
prisons began emerging in the 1980s, and crime statistics for this project were included as far 
back as 1980, prison demographics were considered as far back as 1980 as well.  Information 
about inmate populations in Washington DC proved very difficult to find because it was neither 
available from the Bureau of Justice Statistic nor the Sentencing Project. Ultimately, Washington 
DC was not included in the final analysis but it is worth noting that the District of Columbia has 
one of the highest incarceration rates in the country.44 
Data Organization 
To merge all of these observations together, the private facilities were organized by state 
and the total number of private prisons was added to each state observation for each year. For 
example, Indiana built its first relevant private prison in 1997. For the 1997 Indiana observation, 
one private prison was recorded with a capacity of 1030.  This figure rolls over to 1998 and so on 
until Indiana adds another private prison in 2005. Now that Indiana has two private prisons, the 
2005 observation records 2 private prisons with a collective capacity of 4124. This process was 
repeated for every state and every private prison. By 2012, 17 total states had at least one private 
prison that was included in this project.  Figure 4 above shows the general distribution of private 
prisons across the United States using the most current data from 2012.45 From a quick glance, it 
appears that private prisons are mostly concentrated in the southern half of the United States. 
Notably, Texas has many more private prisons than every other state.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Robert E. Pierre, "D.C. Is Fourth in Nation in Incarcerating Residents, Report Says," Washington Post 
(Washington, DC), April 17, 2008 
45 Figure 4 only represents the private prisons that are included in this paper. The actual number of private prisons in 
each state is much higher when ICE-operated and other excludable facilities are represented. 
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In three cases, private prisons relevant to this project are located in one state but house 
prisoners from a different state. Whenever this was the case, the prison data was recorded under 
the client state rather than the physical location. This decision was based on the conclusion that 
prisoners in these prisons commit crimes in their home states and then return to their home state 
after they serve their sentence. The first example of this scenario is the Saguaro Correctional 
Center in Arizona, which houses prisoners from Hawaii. Presumably, it is much less expensive 
to house Hawaiian prisoners in Arizona than in Hawaii proper. In 2007, this facility housed the 
majority of Hawaii’s male prison population.46 All data from this facility was recorded under the 
state of Hawaii. The second example is the Rivers Correctional Institute in North Carolina, 
which houses prisoners from Washington DC. The District of Columbia was ultimately excluded 
from the analysis due to the limited data available, but this prison was initially recorded under 
the District of Columbia, not North Carolina. The final example is the North Lake Correctional 
Facility, operates under an intergovernmental agreement between the states of Washington and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Kat Brady, "Using Private Prisons Costs More than It Seems," Star Advisor (Honolulu, HI), June 18, 2010. 
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Vermont to house prisoners in a facility located in Michigan. Due to the overlapping 
jurisdictions of this facility and the lack of clear data about the exact origin of the inmates, it was 
excluded from the final analysis.  
After all of the raw data was collected, a number of additional variables were added. The 
incarceration rate was added to the data by dividing the total annual number of prisoners by the 
estimated population of each state. This equation gives us the proportion of people that are 
incarcerated in each state, each year. Like Crime Rates, incarceration rates are often expressed 
per 100,000 people.  Multiplying the proportion by 100, instead of 100,000, gives us the 
percentage of people incarcerated, which is easier to visualize in this analysis. Both the 
percentage of people incarcerated and the number of people incarcerated per 100,000 will have 
the same levels of statistical significance, but the results will have different scales. State 
populations were provided for this variable as a part of the crime statistics from the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics.  
The prominence of private prisons was measured by dividing the current capacity of 
private prisons in each state by the total number of prisoners in each state. In some cases, private 
prisons have built expansions and changed their capacities since their opening. Whenever this 
information was available, it was accounted for. Figure 3 from before, which shows us the 
overall percentage of US prisoners that are housed in private prisons. The overall percentage 
remains small because many states do not use private prisons at all. 
Now that we know the percentage of prisoners that are housed in private prisons, we can 
see just how much individual states depend on private correctional institutions. Figure 5 shows 
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the percentage of people housed in private prisons across all 50 states in 2012. Darker shading 
indicates greater percentages of prisoners housed in private prisons. 47 
 
It is clear that some states have become more reliant on private prisons to house prisoners 
than others. Most notably, Minnesota, New Mexico and Hawaii now house more than 50% of 
their prisoners in private prisons. Maps from the years 1990 and 2010 are included in Appendix 
2 for comparison.  
The complete data set includes individual observations for all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia over the course of 33 years. For each state, the population, the crime data, the number 
of inmates, incarceration rates, the number of private prisons, the size of private prisons, and the 
percentage of prisoners housed in private prisons are all recorded. As previously mentioned, the 
District of Columbia is missing the total number of inmates and the corresponding incarceration 
rates so it was eventually omitted. In total, there are 1716 observations and 36 distinct variables. 
Appendix 1 includes a list of all the privates prisons considered in this project. As noted before, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 The private prison data expressed in all figures and tables refers only to the prisons that were not excluded from 
the analysis 
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if a prison was not included in the final analysis, there is a brief justification in Appendix 1 and 
the excluded prison is shaded darker than the other relevant facilities.  
Dependent and Independent Variables Definitions 
In this project, the independent variable must measure the influence of private prisons at 
the state level and the dependent variable should measure their impact on crime. Rather than use 
the number of private prisons, or the number of people in private prisons, the variable that 
reflects the prevalence of private prisons most accurately is the percent of prisoners in private 
prisons. As we have seen in Figure 3, the percentage of prisoners in private prisons across the 
United States has grown significantly since the 1980s, but still remains fairly small overall.  
Defining the dependent variable was a little trickier than the independent variable. As 
previously mentioned, instead of examining the re-offense rate of prisoners from private prisons 
and prisoners from public prisons, the best measurable indicator of private prisons’ effectiveness 
is crime rate. Because there are many different types of crimes and not all of them are relevant to 
private prisons, the relationship between crime rates and private prisons will vary.  
Regression Analysis 
A regression analysis is the most effective way to examine the relationship between the 
crime rate and private prisons. In order to determine the proper regression model to use, it is 
important to understand what kind of data this is. In this case, we are looking at panel data, also 
known as longitudinal data, or cross sectional time-series data.  Panel data observes the behavior 
of entities over time, and in this case, entities in this panel data are states and the unit of time is 
measured in years. Through the analysis of panel data, I can observe changes that do not 
necessarily crossover between states. This is very important for this project because I am 
interested in the state-level consequences of private prisons.  
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I model state crime rates as a function of the percentage of each state’s prisoners in 
private prison. To control for factors that are difficult to measure and could impact crime rates, I 
used state and year fixed effects to help isolate the relationship between private prisons and 
crime. State fixed effects allow us to examine the impact of the growth of private prisons, 
controlling for time-invariant differences between states. The year fixed effects allow us to 
control for other special events over time that affect everyone but are not easy to measure, such 
as cultural shifts and new laws.  
In each regression, I measured the dependent variable in three different ways. The first 
way considers all 50 states. For many types of analysis, it would be helpful to incorporate all 
states in the regression, including the ones that do not have private prisons, because the states 
without private prisons would provide a point of comparison for states with private prisons.  
The second regression option only measures crime data in each state after it builds the 
first private prison. For example, Tennessee’s first private prison was built in 1984 so I would 
only include observations from Tennessee beginning in 1984 and onward. This option is initially 
appealing because it isolates the years that states have private prisons. However, because I am 
looking at change over time, it is better to include as many years as possible.  For this reason, 
this regression option is not suited for this analysis. 
The third, and best, regression option is a regression analysis that only includes crime 
data from those states with private prisons, but also includes observations as far back as 1980. 
This regression can analyze change over time more effectively and, by excluding states that do 
not have private prisons, there is no risk of deflating the relationship due to the dominance of 
states with zero percent of their prisoners in private prisons.  
Clark-Clough 29 
During the regression analysis, all three types of regressions were run, but the third 
regression option consistently provided the strongest results. Therefore, all the regression results 
that I report only include the 17 states that have private prisons, and date back to 1980. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The different regressions, with different crime statistics as the dependent variable, reveal 
that there may be a connection between the percentage of prisoners in private prisons and the 
crime rate. The key to understanding this relationship is to understand which crime statistics are 
most relevant.  The results change significantly depending on which crime rates are used as the 
dependent variable. Analyzing the types of crimes that are most prevalent in private prisons will 
help us to fully understand the results. Private prisons tend to house specific types of inmates that 
have committed certain types of crimes. As we control for the types of crimes that are most 
commonly reflected in private prisons, the relationship between private prisons and the crime 
rate gets stronger. Table 1 shows the results of the first four regressions in my analysis: 
Table 1: Regression Model Results with State and Year Fixed Effects 
 Model One 
Total Crime Rate 
Model Two 
Property Crime Rate 
Model Three 
Violent Crime Rate 
Model Four 
Violent Crime Rate 
(Excluding Murder) 
% of Prisoners in 
Private Prisons 
 
5.925 3.433 2.492 2.465 
(5.064) (4.660) (0.841)** (0.837)** 
Constant 5,972.925 5,469.023 503.906 493.896 
 (203.660)** (187.031)** (18.404)** (18.355)** 
R2 0.71 0.72 0.49 0.48 
N 561 561 561 561 *!p<0.05;!**!p<0.01!!
In Table 1, we see the coefficients and the standard errors for each regression. One 
asterisks beside the standard error denotes statistical significance to the .05 level and two marks 
the .01 level. The data suggest that there is no relationship between the percent of prisoners in 
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private prisons and total crime rate. As previously mentioned, the total crime rate, in this case, is 
the total number of property crimes and violent crimes committed per 100,000 people. Model 
one, which uses total crime rate as the dependent variable, hints at the possibility of a positive 
relationship, but the results are weak and the standard error is very large. The coefficient is 
positive, which supports the hypothesis, but a 5.92 increase in the total crime rate for each one 
percentage point increase in prisoners housed private prisons is also very small, especially 
considering that the constant for the total crime rate is almost 6,000.  The results also lack 
statistical significance. These results mean that, at this point in the analysis, I cannot confidently 
reject the null hypothesis that private prisons have no relationship to crime rates. 
There are many possible explanations to justify why the results of the first regression 
were insignificant but the most logical reason is that the total crime rate includes a lot of crimes 
that are not relevant to the success of private prisons. The total crime rate includes property 
crime ranging from burglary to motor vehicle theft and violent crime ranging from robbery to 
murder.  The consequences for these crimes vary greatly, and not everyone who commits a 
burglary, for example, serves a sentence in prison. Across the data, property crime rates are, on 
average, nine or ten times larger than violent crime rates so they represent a large majority of the 
total crime rate.  Additionally, property crime rates are generally seen as less serious than violent 
crimes and consequently, property crimes offenders spend less time in jail, if they go to jail at all. 
Another important distinction is that the total crime rate, provided by the Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program, documents the total number of crimes committed, not the number of arrests 
made or the types of sentences served.  Many property crimes remain unsolved, whereas violent 
crimes are seen as a higher priority.  
Clark-Clough 31 
A closer look at private prisons in the state of Texas helps to reaffirm that property 
crimes are probably not linked directly to private prisons. For most states, individual data on the 
types of sentences being served in private prisons are unavailable, which means that it is difficult 
to determine which crimes are most relevant to private corrections. However, in Texas, 
individual data on every adult prisoner is available online. A closer look at the demographics of 
Texas prisons and the criminal records of prisoners reveals that people rarely land in private 
prisons for just property crimes.48 
To rule out property crime completely, I ran a regression with just property crime.  This 
is model two on Table 1. As expected, a regression analysis with just property crime rate as the 
dependent variable has an even weaker coefficient and is statistically insignificant. This does not 
necessarily mean that violent crimes will be statistically significant, but it does help reaffirm that 
property crime is not directly related to the success of private prisons.  
For regression model three, I isolated violent crimes as the dependent variable. The 
results in Table 1 show that using the violent crime rate as the dependent variable is statistically 
significant, with a much smaller standard error. The coefficient of 2.49 is not very big, but the 
constant is much smaller for violent crime rates, which means that this coefficient is much 
stronger. For context, Figure 6 demonstrates the annual changes in violent crime for all 17 states.   
As we can see from Figure 6, on the following page, the violent crime rate has gone 
down in just about every state since the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The lines overlap a lot, but 
the most important observation is that crime as a whole increased in the 1980s and then began to 
fall in the 1990s. Most recently, in 2012, crime rates are lower in most states than they have been 
in decades. The reasons for this drop in crime are not entirely clear and many studies have tried 
to isolate the cause of the dramatic drop. The hypotheses to explain this crime behavior have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 "Prison Units," Texas Tribune, https://www.texastribune.org/library/data/texas-prisons/units/. 
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varied greatly. Scholars have concluded that maybe effective policing, or rising prison 
populations, and even the legalization of abortion after Roe V. Wade49 could have been the 
catalysts for the drop in crime.  For the purposes of this project, the underlying explanation for 
this drop in crime is not particularly relevant unless it is caused by the advent of private prisons. 
Year fixed effects account for the aggregate trends that may have caused the drop in crime over 
the years so that the regression analysis can isolate the relationship between private prisons and 
crime. Additionally, just because the crime rate is dropping does not necessarily mean that 
private prisons are working effectively. 
 
If private prisons are effective, for every increase in private prisons, there should be a 
drop in the crime rate. Because the growth of private prisons and the crime rates are moving in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Steven D. Levitt, "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that 
Do Not," Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 1 (Winter 2004) 
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opposite directions, at first glance, this might be a tempting conclusion. However, a positive 
coefficient suggests that the hypothesis is correct—that the increase in private prisons correlates 
with an increase in crime.  The coefficients from the regression analysis and the smaller errors 
suggest that the growth of private prisons and crime have a positive relationship. This suggests 
that as private prisons grew, crime rates to rose, even though crime rates overall were falling.  
The evidence is just as strong if we exclude murder from the violent crime rates. This 
regression, with all violent crimes except murder as the dependent variable, was model four in 
Table 1.  The coefficient for model four is very similar to model three. The results are very close, 
which is understandable because murder accounts for a very small percentage of violent crime.  
Excluding murder is justified because people convicted of murder serve much longer 
sentences, which means that the data on their re-offense rates is still pending because they are 
still in prison. Additionally, prisoners convicted of murder are rarely detained in private prisons. 
Instead, they usually serve their sentences in federal, higher security facilities.   
Table 2: Regression Model Results for Individual Violent Crimes 
 Model Five 
Robbery Rate 
Model Six 
Aggravated 
Assault Rate 
Model Seven 
Murder Rate 
Model Eight 
Forcible Rape 
Rate 
% of Prisoners in 
Private Prisons 
 
0.752 1.571 0.028 0.143 
(0.318)* (0.580)* (0.013) (0.055)* 
Constant 174.424 280.535 10.029 38.941 
 (8.179)** (12.953)** (0.513)** (2.156)** 
R2 0.46 0.44 0.56 0.28 
N 561 561 561 561 
• p<0.05;!**!p<0.01!!
Regressions for each of the individual violent crimes, except murder and non-negligent 
homicide, all yield statistically significant results as well. The results of these regressions appear 
in Table 2 as models five through eight. All of these coefficients are still positive, which supports 
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the hypothesis. Understandably, each regression for these individual crimes as dependent 
variables has a smaller coefficient. When combined, as they were in models three and four, into 
one dependent variable, there is a stronger relationship. For reference, the complete regression 
tables that also express the annual change in crime are available in Appendices Three and Four.  
POTENTIAL)CONCERNS)
)
The findings of this study show that there is a positive correlation between the growth of 
private prisons and the violent crime rate. However, as always the concern is whether or not this 
correlation actually indicates causation. There are a number of reasons that the data could have 
indicated a positive relationship between the percent of prisoners in private prisons and the 
violent crime rate. At this point, the most effective way to substantiate the findings of this study 
would be to collect data at the individual level and compare the post-release outcomes of people 
who served sentences in private prisons to those who served sentences in publicly operated 
prisons.   
While the final data matrix is as complete as possible, as always, there are some notable 
concerns. As we have discussed, ideally the data would trace recidivism at the individual level. 
The consequence of widening the frame to study general trends in crime rates is that there is a lot 
more room for confounding variables to interfere with the results. Comparing states against 
themselves helps to control for some of these confounding variables, but there are still 
opportunities for interference. Even if there were no concerns about confounding variables, 
studying crime data at the state level is far less acute than studying recidivism at the individual 
level and the results will be more general.  
While the justification behind excluding any facility is rationally based on the impact that 
it will have on the research, there is still some room for subjectivity. Of the facilities that were 
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originally recorded, a large percentage of them were ultimately excluded from the statistical 
analysis. There are also a number of facilities such as the aforementioned GEO-community 
facilities that were never even recorded due to their blanket excludability. No facility was 
excluded without justification, but the results of this project may have been different had all 
private facilities been included, or had been included based on different criteria.    
There is no cause for concern with the state-level crime data or with the estimated 
populations of each state from which incarceration rates and crime rates were derived. All of this 
data is directly available from the US Department of Justice and in their records. However, the 
data on private prisons and the number of people in private prisons is probably not a perfect 
reflection of the true values. Actual occupancy of each of these prisons is not widely available.  
Instead, this project recorded the capacity of private prisons and used that number as the marker 
of how many people are incarcerated in private prisons. Unfortunately, this method assumes that 
the private prisons are always operating at or near capacity. Ideally, the number of people in 
private prisons would be an exact number for each year, particularly because exact data on the 
total number of people in prison is readily available for each state. Whenever possible, the data 
reflects expansions and construction in private prisons over the years. This accounts for the fact 
that private prisons have not had the same capacity for the entirety of their existence. However, 
there is not cause for great concern that the percentage of people in private prisons is overly 
inflated, particularly because there has been concern about prison over-crowding in the United 
States for decades.50  
As previously mentioned, the state of Texas offers information about all of the prisoners 
in its system so, in theory, it would be possible to verify the actual Current occupancy of each 
private prison in Texas. Using Texas as a model, we could generate a multiplier that estimated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50Gerald G. Gaes, Prison Crowding Research Reexamined (n.p.: Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1994) 
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the percentage of full capacity in each private prison by averaging the fullness of all the Texan 
facilities. This multiplier could help estimate the actual occupancy of each private prison across 
the country. The reason that this process was not included in this project is because the 
occupancy of prisons in Texas does not necessarily have any relation to the occupancy of prisons 
in other states. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There are many reasons to be skeptical of private prisons in the United States. Horror 
stories such the Pennsylvania judge who accepted bribes from private prison owners and sent 
juveniles to prison for small crimes, as well as the underlying economic interest of private 
companies to keep people imprisoned, raise suspicions about whether or not private prisons 
deserve a role in our society. Whether or not we are inclined to support privatization or oppose it, 
it is essential that we continue to monitor these institutions and hold them accountable to the 
mandate they serve.  
As we have discussed, one of the primary goals of a correctional institution is to offer 
rehabilitation services and, by definition, “correct” behavior.  With this in mind, it follows that 
recidivism rates are an effective tool to measure the efficacy of prisons. In at least some respects, 
prisons with higher recidivism rates are not fulfilling their role in society as effectively as prisons 
with lower recidivism rates.  Prisons are expensive, and keeping people out of prisons, in theory, 
should alleviate that financial burden from the state. However, private prisons have changed the 
game because they profit when people are in prison rather than out of it.  Therefore, the concern 
that prisons will not offer strong reentry programs because it is not financially beneficial is very 
legitimate.  
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The data in my analysis suggest that private prisons are not effective at reducing crime 
rates. The significant results imply that, across states with private prisons, as private prisons 
grow, there is a correlated increase in crime. The data are strongest when violent crime rates are 
expressed as a function of the percentage of people in private prisons. While the coefficients are 
not particularly large, all of the results showed a positive relationship, which is concerning. Even 
a neutral relationship would be concerning because the prisons, in theory, should be lessening 
crime, not maintaining or growing it.   
As I discussed in the potential concerns section, there are a number of factors that may 
have confounded this analysis.  As Grant Duwe and Valarie Clark discussed in their analysis of 
private prisons in Wisconsin, the demographics of private prisons are different than other 
prisons. Inmates tend to be younger, are often affiliated with drug crimes and serve shorter 
sentences.51 Excluding irrelevant facilities controlled for as many of these factors as possible, but 
without the individual data on individual prisoners who came from private and public prisons, all 
else being equal, it is near impossible to rule out all confounding variables.   
The state and year fixed effects helped to control for more variability in the results by 
accounting for aggregate changes unrelated to private prisons as well as time shocks that are the 
result of greater social movements.  For future research into this subject, the next logical step 
would be to run regressions based on individual data rather than overall trends in crime and 
private prisons. This analysis would help to isolate the relationship more directly. Conclusively, 
in this analysis, the effectiveness of private prisons is still not entirely clear, but the significant 
results in certainly warrant further investigation.   
 !  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Duwe and Clark, "The Effects of Private," 
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Facility( Exclude?( State( Customer(
Parent(
Corp(
Year(
Privatized( Capacity(
Adams&County&Correctional&Center& Yes3ICE& MS& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons/ICE1& CCA2& 2007& 2567&
Adelanto&Detention&Facility& Yes3ICE& CA& City&of&Adelanto/California/ICE& GEO3& 2010& 1940&
Alexandria&Transfer&Center& Yes3ICE& LA& ICE& GEO& 2013& 400&
Alhambra&Jail& Yes3JAIL& CA& The&City&of&Alhambra& GEO& & 67&
Allen&Correctional&Center& & LA& Louisiana&Department&of&Public&Safety&and&Corrections&& GEO& 1990& 1538&
Arizona&State&Prison&3&Florence&West& & AZ& Arizona&Department&of&Corrections& GEO& 1997& 750&
Arizona&State&Prison&3&Phoenix&West& & AZ& Arizona&Department&of&Corrections& GEO& 1996& 450&
Arizona&State&Prison&Complex–Kingman& & AZ& Arizona&Department&of&Corrections& GEO& 2015& 3400&
Arizona&State&Prison3Marana& & AZ& Arizona&Departament&of&Corrections& MTC
4& 19945& 513&
Aurora&Detention&Facility& Yes3ICE& CO& ICE& GEO& 1986& 1532&
Austin&Residential&Reentry&Center& Yes3HALFWAY& TX& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons& CCA& & 80&
Austin&Transitional&Center& Yes3HALFWAY& TX& Texas&Department&of&Criminal&Justice& CCA& & 421&
Baldwin&Park&Jail& Yes3JAIL& CA& The&City&of&Baldwin&Park& GEO& & &
Bartlett&State&Jail& & TX& Texas&Department&of&Criminal&Justice,&State&Jail&Division& CCA& 1995& 1049&
Bay&Correctional&Facility& & FL& Florida&Department&of&Management&Services&& GEO& 2014& 985&
Bent&County&Correctional&Facility& & CO& Colorado&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 1996& 1466&
Big&Spring&Correctional&Center& & TX& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons&& GEO& 2010& 3509&
Billy&Moore&Correctional&Center& & TX& Texas&Department&Criminal&Justice& MTC& 1995
6& 513&
Blackwater&River&Correctional&Facility& & FL& Florida&Department&of&Management&Services&& GEO& 2010& 2000&
Bradshaw&State&Jail& & TX& Texas&Department&of&Criminal&Justice& CCA& 2004& 1980&
Bridgeport&Pre3Parole&Transfer&Facility& & TX& Texas&Department&Criminal&Justice& MTC& 1987
7& 203&
Brooks&County&Detention&Center& Yes3MARSHALS& TX& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons&&&U.S.&Marshals&Service&& GEO& & &
Broward&Transitional&Center& Yes3ICE& FL& ICE& GEO& 2002& 700&
CAI&3&Boston&Avenue& & CA& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons&&&San&Diego&County& CCA& 2013& 120&
CAI&3&Ocean&View& & CA& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons&&&San&Diego&County& CCA& 2013& 483&
Carver&Transitional&Center& Yes3HALFWAY& OK& Oklahoma&Department&of&Corrections/Oklahoma&Department&of& CCA& 19858& 556&!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Judith!Greene!and!Alexis!Mazón,!Privately*Operated*Federal*Prisons*for*Immigrants:*Expensive*Unsafe*Unnecessary!(n.p.:!Justice!Strategies,!2012),!2!"CCA*Facilities!List,"!Corrections!Corporation!of!America,!http://www.cca.com/locations.!3!"The!GEO!Group:!Locations,"!GEO!Group,!http://www.geogroup.com/maps/index/1.!4!"Locations,"!MTC:!Management!and!Training!Corporation,!https://www.mtctrains.com/locations.!5!"Marana,"!Arizona!Department!of!Corrections,!https://corrections.az.gov/location/108/marana.!6!"Unit!Directory*Billy!Moore!Correctional!Center,"!Texas!Department!of!Criminal!Justice,!http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/bm.html.! !7!"Unit!Directory*Bridgeport!Pre*Parole!Transfer!Facility,"!Texas!Department!of!Criminal!Justice,!http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/t1.html.!8!"Carver!Transitional!Center,"!Avalon!Correctional!Services,!http://www.avaloncorrections.com/carver*center/.!
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Corrections&
California&City&Correctional&Center& Yes3LEASED& CA& **LEASED&BY&CALIFORNIA&DEPARTMENT&OF&CORRECTIONS& CCA& & 2304&
Central&Arizona&Correctional&Facility& Yes3ICE& AZ& Arizona&Department&of&Corrections/ICE& GEO& 2006& 1280&
Central&Arizona&Detention&Center& Yes3ICE& AZ& US&Marshals&Service/ICE& CCA& 1994& 2304&
Central&Texas&Detention&Facility& Yes3ICE& TX& Bexar&County,&Texas&&&U.S.&Marshals&Service/ICE(IGA)&& GEO& 1987& 688&
Central&Valley&MCCF& & CA& California&Department&of&Corrections&&&Rehabilitation&(CDCR)&& GEO& 1996
9& 700&
Cheyenne&Transitional&Center& Yes3HALFWAY& WY& Wyoming&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& & 126&
Cibola&County&Correctional&Center& & NM& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons& CCA& 1998& 1204&
Cimarron&Correctional&Facility& & OK& Oklahoma&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 1997& 1720&
Citrus&County&Detention&Facility& Yes3MARSHALS& FL& Citrus&County/U.S.&Marshals&Service/U.S.&Virgin&Islands&& CCA& 1995& 760&
Cleveland&Correctional&Center& & TX& Texas&Department&Criminal&Justice& MTC& 1989
10& 520&
Coastal&Bend&Detention&Center& Yes3ICE& TX& ICE& GEO& & 1176&
Coffee&Correctional&Facility& & GA& Georgia& CCA& 1998& 3032&
Corpus&Christi&Transitional&Center& Yes3HALFWAY& TX& Texas&Department&of&Criminal&Justice& CCA& & 110&
Correctional&Treatment&Facility& & DC& District&of&Columbia& CCA& 1997& 1500&
Crossroads&Correctional&Center& & MT& The&State&of&Montana& CCA& 1999& 715&
Crowley&County&Correctional&Facility& & CO& Colorado&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 2003& 1894&
D.&Ray&James&Correctional&Facility& Yes3ICE& GA& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons&&&U.S.&Marshals&Service&(IGA)&& GEO& 2010& 2847&
Dallas&Transitional&Center& Yes3HALFWAY& TX& Texas&Department&of&Criminal&Justice& CCA& 201111& 225&
Davis&Correctional&Facility& & OK& The&State&of&Oklahoma& CCA& 1996& 1600&
Desert&View&MCCF& & CA& California&Department&of&Corrections&&&Rehabilitation&(CDCR)&& GEO& 1996
12& 700&
Diamondback&Correctional&Facility& Yes3LEASED& OK& CONTRACTED&OUT& CCA& & 2160&
Diboll&Correctional&Center& & TX& Texas&Department&Criminal&Justice& MTC& 1995
13& 518&
Downey&City&Jail&3&LA&County& Yes3JAIL& CA& Downey&Police&Department& GEO& & 30&
East&Hidalgo&Detention&Center& Yes3ICE& TX& US&Marshals&Service/ICE& GEO& & 1300&
East&Mississippi&Correctional&Facility& & MS& Mississippi&Department&of&Corrections& MTC& 1999
14& 1376&
East&Texas&Treatment&Facility& & TX& Texas&Department&Criminal&Justice& MTC& 2004
15& 2282&!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!9!Anonymous!post!to!Prison!Talk!web!forum,!"General!Information!and!MCCFs,"!http://www.prisontalk.com/forums/archive/index.php/t*252783.html!10"Unit!Directory*Cleveland!Correctional!Center,"!Texas!Department!of!Criminal!Justice,!http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/cv.html.!11!Amy!Martin,!"At!Dallas'!Once!Stylish!Cabana!Motor!Hotel,!Ex*Prisoners!Struggle!to!Re*Enter!the!World,"!Dallas*Observer!(Dallas,!TX),!April!15,!2015.!12!Anonymous!post!to!Prison!Talk!web!forum,!"General!Information!and!MCCFs."!13!"Unit!Directory*Diboll!Correctional!Center,"!Texas!Department!of!Criminal!Justice,!http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/do.html.!14!"Private!Prisons*East!Mississippi!Correctional!Facility,"!Mississippi!Department!of!Corrections,!http://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Institutions/Pages/Private*Prisons.aspx#East.!15!"Unit!Directory*East!Texas!Multi*Use!Facility,"!Texas!Department!of!Criminal!Justice,!http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/xq.html.!
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Eden&Detention&Center& & TX& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons& CCA& 1995& 1558&
El&Paso&Multi3Use&Facility& Yes3HALFWAY& TX& Texas&Department&of&Criminal&Justice/US&District&Court& CCA& & 324&
El&Paso&Transitional&Center& Yes3HALFWAY& TX& Texas&Department&of&Criminal&Justice& CCA& & 200&
Elizabeth&Detention&Center&& Yes3ICE& NJ& ICE& CCA& 1997& 300&
Eloy&Detention&Center& Yes3ICE& AZ& ICE& CCA& 1994& 1596&
Florence&Correctional&Center& Yes3ICE/MARSHAL& AZ& Vermont/US&Marshals&Service/ICE& CCA& 1999& 1824&
Fontana&City&Jail& Yes3JAIL& CA& Fontina& GEO& & 39&
Fort&Worth&Transitional&Center&& Yes3HALFWAY& TX& Texas&Department&of&Criminal&Justice/Texas&Department&of&State&Health&Services& CCA& & 220&
Gadsden&Correctional&Facility& & FL& Florida&Department&of&Corrections& MTC& 1995
16& 1609&
Garden&Grove&City&Jail& Yes3JAIL& CA& Garden&Grove& GEO& & &
Giles&W.&Dalby&Correctional&Facility& Yes3ICE& TX& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons&(Criminal&Aliens)& MTC& 1999& 2063&
Golden&State&Modified&Community&Correctional&Facility& CA& California&Department&of&Corrections&&&Rehabilitation&(CDCR)&& GEO& 199617& 700&
Graceville&Correctional&Facility& & FL& Florida&Department&of&Management&Services&& GEO& 2007
18& 1884&
Great&Plains&Correctional&Facility& & OK& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons&& GEO& 2014& 1940&
Guadalupe&County&Correctional&Facility& & NM&
Guadalupe&County,&New&Mexico&&&New&Mexico&Corrections&
Department&(IGA)&& GEO& 1996& 600&
Hardeman&County&Correctional&Center& & TN& The&State&of&Tennessee& CCA& 1997& 2016&
Heritage&Trail&Correctional&Facility& Yes3HALFWAY& IN& Indiana& GEO& 2010& 1066&
Houston&Processing&Center& Yes3ICE& TX& ICE& CCA& 1984& 1000&
Huerfano&County&Correctional&Center& Yes3LEASED& CO& CONTRACTED&OUT& CCA& & 752&
IAH&Secure&Adult&Detention&Center& Yes3ICE& TX& ICE& MTC& & &
Idaho&Capp&Facility& & ID& Idaho&Department&of&Corrections& MTC& 2010
19& 442&
Imperial&Regional&Detention&Facility& Yes3ICE& CA& ICE& MTC& & 782&
Jenkins&Correctional&Center& & GA& The&State&of&Georgia& CCA& 2012& 1150&
Joe&Corley&Detention&Facility& Yes3ICE& TX& US&Marshals&Service/ICE& GEO& 2004& 1517&
Karnes&County&Correctional&Center& Yes3ICE& TX& Karnes&County,&Texas&&&ICE&(IGSA)&& GEO& 1998& 679&
Karnes&County&Residential&Center& Yes3ICE& TX& Karnes&County,&Texas&&&ICE&(IGSA)&& GEO& 2010& 532&
Kit&Carson&Correctional&Center&& & CO& Colorado&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 1998& 1488&
Kyle&Correctional&Center& & TX& Texas&Department&Criminal&Justice& MTC& 1989
20& 530&!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16!"Gadsden!Correctional!Facility!–!Florida,"!Prison!Handbook,!http://prisonhandbook.com/8481/gadsden*correctional*facility*florida/.!17!Anonymous!post!to!Prison!Talk!web!forum,!"General!Information!and!MCCFs."!18!Anonymous!post!to!Prison!Talk!web!forum,!"General!Information!and!MCCFs."!19!"Correctional!Alternative!Placement!Program!(CAPP),"!Idaho!Department!of!Correction,!https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/locations/prisons/correctional_alternative_placement_program.!20!"Unit!Directory*Kyle!Correctional!Center,"!Texas!Department!of!Criminal!Justice,!http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/ky.html.!
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La&Palma&Correctional&Center& & AZ& California&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 2008& 3060&
Lake&City&Correctional&Facility& & FL& Florida&Department&of&Management&Services
21&& CCA& 1997& 893&
Lake&Erie&Correctional&Institution& & OH& Ohio&Department&of&Rehabilitation&and&Correction& CCA& 2012& &
Laredo&Processing&Center& Yes3ICE& TX& ICE& CCA& 1985& 404&
LaSalle&Detention&Facility& Yes3ICE& LA& ICE& GEO& 2006& 1160&
Lawrenceville&Correctional&Center& & VA& Virginia&Department&of&Corrections& GEO& 2003& 1536&
Lawton&Correctional&Facility& & OK& Oklahoma&Department&of&Corrections& GEO& 1997& 2682&
Lea&County&Correctional&Facility& & NM& Lea&County,&New&Mexico&&&New&Mexico&Corrections&Department&& GEO& 1996& 1200&
Leavenworth&Detention&Center&& Yes3MARSHALS& KS& US&Marshals&Service& CCA& 1992& 1126&
Lee&Adjustment&Center&& Yes3VACANT& KY& VACANT& CCA& 1998& 845&
Lindsey&State&Jail& & TX& Texas&Department&of&Criminal&Justice& CCA& 2004& 1031&
Lockhart&Correction&Center& & TX& Texas&Department&Criminal&Justice& MTC& 1993
22& 1000&
Marion&Adjustment&Center&& Yes3VACANT& KY& VACANT& & 1998& 826&
Marion&County&Jail&II& & IN& Marion&County&Sheriff's&Department& CCA& 1997& 1030&
Marshall&County&Correction&Center& & MS& Mississippi&Department&of&Corrections& MTC& 1996
23& 1076&
McFarland&Female&Community&Reentry&
Facility& & CA& California&Department&of&Corrections&&&Rehabilitation&(CDCR)&& GEO& 1986& 300&
McRae&Correctional&Facility& & GA& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons& CCA& 2000& 2275&
Mesa&Verde&Detention&Facility& Yes3ICE& CA& City&of&McFarland/ICE& GEO& 2015& 400&
Metro3Davidson&County&Detention&Facility& & TN& Nashville&&&Davidson&County& CCA& 1992& 1348&
Montebello&City&Jail& Yes3JAIL& CA& City&of&Montebello& GEO& & 25&
Moore&Haven&Correctional&Facility& & FL& Florida&Department&of&Management&Services&& GEO& 1995& 985&
Moshannon&Valley&Correctional&Center& Yes3ICE& PA& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons&& GEO& 2006& 1820&
Nevada&Southern&Detention&Center& Yes3MARSHALS& NV& US&Marshals&Service& CCA& 2010& 1072&
New&Castle&Correctional&Facility& & IN& Indiana&Department&of&Correction& GEO& 2005& 3094&
New&Mexico&Women's&Correctional&Facility&& & NM& The&State&of&New&Mexico& CCA& 1989& 611&
North&Central&Correctional&Complex& & OH& Ohio&Department&of&Rehabilitation&and&Correction& MTC& 1994
24& 2852&
North&Fork&Correctional&Facility& Yes3LEASED& OK& CONTRACTED&OUT& CCA& 1998& 2400&
North&Lake&Correctional&Facility& Yes3TWO&STATES& MI& Washington&Department&of&Corrections/Vermont&Department&of&Corrections& GEO& 1999& 1740&!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21"Lake!City!Correctional!Facility,"!Florida!Department!of!Corrections,!http://www.dc.state.fl.us/facilities/region2/219.html.!22!"Unit!Directory*Lockhart!Correctional!Facility,"!Texas!Department!of!Criminal!Justice,!http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/lc.html.!23!"Private!Prisons*Marshall!County!Correctional!Facility,"!Mississippi!Department!of!Corrections,!http://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Institutions/Pages/Private*Prisons.aspx#Marshall.!24!"North!Central!Correctional!Complex,"!Ohio!Department!of!Rehabilitation!and!Correction,!http://www.drc.ohio.gov/public/ncci.htm.!
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Northeast&New&Mexico&Detention&Facility& & NM& Town&of&Clayton&&&New&Mexico&Corrections&Department& GEO& 2008
25& 625&
Northeast&Ohio&Correctional&Center& Yes3MARSHALS& OH& US&Marshals&Service& CCA& 1997& 2016&
Northwest&Detention&Center& Yes3ICE& WA& ICE& GEO& 2004& 1575&
Ontario&City&Jail& Yes3JAIL& CA& The&City&of&Ontario&Police&Department& GEO& & 40&
Otay&Mesa&Detention&Center&& Yes3ICE& CA& US&Marshals&Service/ICE& CCA& 2015& 1567&
Otero&County&Processing&Center& Yes3ICE& NM& ICE& MTC& & 1089&
Otter&Creek&Correctional&Center& Yes3VACANT& KY& VACANT& CCA& & 656&
Pine&Prairie&Correctional&Center& Yes3ICE& LA& Louisiana&Department&of&Public&Safety,&Parish&County& GEO& & 1094&
Prairie&Correctional&Facility&& Yes3LEASED& MN& CONTRACTED&OUT& CCA& & 1600&
Queens&Detention&Facility& Yes3ICE& NY& US&Marshals&Service/ICE& GEO& 2005& 222&
Red&Rock&Correctional&Center& & AZ& Arizona&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 2006& 1596&
Reeves&County&Detention&Complex&
(R1&R2)& Yes3ICE& TX& Reeves&County&&Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons& GEO& 2003& 2407&
Reeves&County&Detention&Complex&(R3)& Yes3ICE& TX& Reeves&County&&Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons& GEO& 2003& 1356&
Rio&Grande&Detention&Center& & TX& Office&of&Federal&Detention&Trustee—US&Marshals&Service& GEO& 2008& 1900&
Riverbend&Correctional&Facility& & GA& Georgia&Department&of&Corrections& GEO& 2011& 1500&
Rivers&Correctional&Institution& &
NC&
(DC)& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons&&(District&of&Columbia)& GEO& 2000& 1450&
Robert&A.&Deyton&Detention&Facility& Yes3MARSHALS& GA& Office&of&Federal&Detention&Trustee—US&Marshals&Service& GEO& 2007& 768&
Saguaro&Correctional&Center& &
AZ&
(HI)& The&State&of&Hawaii& CCA& 2007& 1926&
Sanders&Estes&Unit& & TX& Texas&Department&Criminal&Justice& MTC& 1989
26& 1049&
Silverdale&Detention&Facilities& & TN& Hamilton&County,&Tennessee& CCA& 1984& 1062&
South&Bay&Correctional&Facility& & FL& Florida&Department&of&Management&Services&& GEO& 1997& 1898&
South&Central&Correctional&Center& & TN& Tennessee&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 1992& 1676&
South&Louisiana&Correctional&Center& Yes3ICE& LA& ICE& GEO& & &
South&Texas&Detention&Complex& Yes3ICE& TX& ICE& GEO& 2005& 1904&
South&Texas&Family&Residential&Center& Yes3ICE& TX& ICE& CCA& 2014& 2400&
South&Texas&Intermediate&Sanction&Facility& & TX& Texas&Department&Criminal&Justice& MTC& 1993
27& 459&
Stewart&Detention&Center& Yes3ICE& GA& ICE& CCA& 2006& 1752&
T.&Don&Hutto&Residential&Center& Yes3ICE& TX& ICE& CCA& 1996& 512&
Taft&Correctional&Institution& & CA& Federal&Bureau&of&Prisons& MTC& & 2500&!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!25!"Northeast!New!Mexico!Detention!Facility,"!New!Mexico!Corrections!Department!Adult!Prisons,!http://cd.nm.gov/apd/nenmdf.html.!26!"Unit!Directory*Sanders!'Sandy'!Estes!Unit,"!Texas!Department!of!Criminal!Justice,!http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/vs.html.!27!"Unit!Directory*South!Texas!Intermediate!Sanction!Facility,"!Texas!Department!of!Criminal!Justice,!http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/xm.html.!
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Tallahatchie&County&Correctional&Facility& & MS& Tallahatchie&County,&State&of&California& CCA& 2000& 2800&
Torrance&County&Detention&Facility& Yes3ICE& NM& US&Marshals&Service/ICE/Torrance&County&Sherriff's&Office/Sierra&County/Bernalillo&County/Curry&County& CCA& 1990& 910&
Trousdale&Turner&Correctional&Center& & TN& Tennessee&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 2015& 2552&
Tulsa&Transitional&Center& Yes3HALFWAY& OK& Oklahoma&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 199528& 390&
Turley&Residential&Center& Yes3HALFWAY& OK& Oklahoma&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 199729& 289&
Val&Verde&Correctional&Facility& Yes3ICE& TX&
Val&Verde&County,&Texas,&U.S.&Immigration&&&Customs&
Enforcement/US&Marshals&Service/Bureau&of&Prison&(IGA)&&&
Department&of&Homeland&Security3Border&Protection&(IGA)&&
GEO& 2001& 1407&
Walnut&Grove&Correctional&Facility& & MS& Mississippi&Department&of&Corrections& MTC& 2001
30& 962&
Webb&County&Detention&Center& Yes3MARSHALS& TX& US&Marshals&Service& CCA& 1999& 480&
West&Tennessee&Detention&Facility& Yes3ICE& TN& US&Marshals&Service/ICE/Homeland&Security& CCA& 1990& 600&
West&Texas&Intermediate&Sanction&Facility& & TX& Texas&Parole&Division& MTC& 1992
31& 289&
Western&Region&Detention&Facility&at&San&
Diego& Yes3MARSHALS& CA& Office&of&Federal&Detention&Trustee/&US&Marshals&Service&& GEO& 2000& 770&
Wheeler&Correctional&Facility& & GA& The&State&of&Georgia& CCA& 1998& 3028&
Whiteville&Correctional&Facility& & TN& Tennessee&Department&of&Corrections& CCA& 1998& 1536&
Wilkinson&County&Correctional&Facility& & MS& Mississippi&Department&of&Corrections& MTC& 1998
32& 747&
Willacy&County&Regional&Detention&Facility& Yes3MARSHALS& TX& US&Marshal&Service& MTC& & 568&
Willacy&County&State&Jail& & TX& Texas&Department&of&Criminal&Justice& CCA& 2004& 1069&!*All!information!contained!in!this!appendix!is!either!available!on!the!corporate!website!or!the!alternative!source!has!been!noted!with!a!footnote—the!corporate!sources!are!footnoted!the!first!time!that!they!appear!in!this!appendix!**Shaded!prisons!have!been!excluded!from!the!statistical!analysis—the!second!column!offers!a!brief!rational!for!the!omission!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!28!"Tulsa!Transitional!Center,"!Avalon!Correctional!Services,!http://www.avaloncorrections.com/tulsa*center/.!29!ibid.!30!"Private!Prisons*Walnut!Grove!Correctional!Facility,"!Mississippi!Department!of!Corrections,!http://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Institutions/Pages/Private*Prisons.aspx#WalnutGrove.!31!"Unit!Directory*West!Texas!Intermediate!Sanction!Facility,"!Texas!Department!of!Criminal!Justice,!http://tdcj.state.tx.us/unit_directory/xn.html.!32!"Private!Prisons*Wilkinson!County!Correctional!Center,"!Mississippi!Department!of!Corrections,!http://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Institutions/Pages/Private*Prisons.aspx#Wilkinson.!
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Appendix 3: Unabridged Regression Model Results with State and Year Fixed Effects 
 Model One 
Total Crime Rate 
Model Two 
Property Crime Rate 
Model Three 
Violent Crime Rate 
Model Four 
Violent Crime Rate 
(Excluding Murder) 
% of Prisoners in 
Private Prisons 
 
5.925 3.433 2.492 2.465 
(5.064) (4.660) (0.841)** (0.837)** 
1980 (Base Year) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1981 -186.240 -172.800 -13.441 -12.956 
 (68.310)* (62.188)* (7.986) (7.887) 
1982 -378.242 -348.582 -29.671 -28.356 
 (108.973)** (97.030)** (14.647) (14.522) 
1983 -787.403 -728.247 -59.176 -56.784 
 (142.779)** (130.532)** (14.721)** (14.643)** 
1984 -886.212 -833.701 -52.491 -49.965 
 (150.558)** (139.058)** (14.582)** (14.506)** 
1985 -618.096 -584.756 -33.361 -30.961 
 (177.291)** (166.963)** (14.126)* (14.049)* 
1986 -316.044 -327.047 10.996 12.874 
 (202.764) (191.319) (16.233) (16.280) 
1987 -265.234 -256.882 -8.351 -5.967 
 (211.171) (203.433) (13.030) (13.216) 
1988 -242.247 -255.455 13.173 15.434 
 (220.085) (208.026) (16.921) (17.053) 
1989 -135.180 -166.634 31.452 33.935 
 (226.985) (212.800) (19.409) (19.450) 
1990 -50.392 -142.185 91.788 93.604 
 (220.401) (203.163) (24.469)** (24.542)** 
1991 -104.024 -217.861 113.836 115.390 
 (230.666) (208.066) (27.564)** (27.511)** 
1992 -232.177 -357.556 125.364 127.264 
 (199.222) (179.926) (28.536)** (28.653)** 
1993 -321.656 -448.926 127.263 129.032 
 (204.823) (184.567)* (29.924)** (29.880)** 
1994 -329.864 -432.300 102.433 104.282 
 (202.828) (186.452)* (27.414)** (27.397)** 
1995 -301.170 -392.662 91.483 93.381 
 (220.625) (200.852) (28.308)** (28.157)** 
1996 -500.003 -546.344 46.347 49.221 
 (280.027) (255.873)* (29.892) (29.778) 
1997 -673.577 -692.726 19.139 22.682 
 (299.764)* (273.992)* (30.934) (30.847) 
1998 -1,038.754 -1,022.088 -16.669 -12.534 
 (310.477)** (283.275)** (32.477) (32.197) 
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1999 -1,511.384 -1,451.134 -60.249 -55.638 
 (327.211)** (298.685)** (33.794) (33.545) 
2000 -1,611.522 -1,537.007 -74.529 -69.499 
 (328.776)** (300.461)** (33.199)* (32.901) 
2001 -1,556.771 -1,492.175 -64.607 -59.535 
 (321.973)** (291.028)** (35.769) (35.511) 
2002 -1,537.268 -1,466.452 -70.819 -65.886 
 (311.094)** (280.746)** (35.769) (35.505) 
2003 -1,637.545 -1,550.839 -86.706 -81.854 
 (310.781)** (280.604)** (36.286)* (36.000)* 
2004 -1,746.763 -1,652.668 -94.100 -89.207 
 (322.439)** (291.422)** (37.643)* (37.343)* 
2005 -1,832.521 -1,739.574 -92.882 -87.781 
 (316.731)** (284.025)** (39.299)* (38.980)* 
2006 -1,999.413 -1,924.252 -75.154 -70.341 
 (329.510)** (297.059)** (40.602) (40.271) 
2007 -2,086.280 -2,003.280 -83.003 -78.388 
 (352.860)** (317.471)** (42.082) (41.680) 
2008 -2,243.774 -2,140.285 -103.482 -98.376 
 (363.294)** (328.929)** (42.035)* (41.661)* 
2009 -2,423.762 -2,292.366 -131.384 -126.053 
 (374.461)** (338.928)** (43.811)** (43.338)* 
2010 -2,575.030 -2,412.551 -162.462 -156.549 
 (376.547)** (340.921)** (45.337)** (44.896)** 
2011 -2,626.293 -2,450.184 -176.100 -170.259 
 (382.345)** (346.183)** (46.859)** (46.360)** 
2012 -2,691.128 -2,512.035 -179.099 -173.142 
 (371.328)** (333.672)** (48.514)** (48.031)** 
Constant 5,972.925 5,469.023 503.906 493.896 
 (203.660)** (187.031)** (18.404)** (18.355)** 
R2 0.71 0.72 0.49 0.48 
N 561 561 561 561 *!p<0.05;!**!p<0.01!
 !  
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Appendix 4: Unabridged Regression Model Results for Individual Violent Crimes 
 Model Five 
Robbery Rate 
Model Six 
Aggravated 
Assault Rate 
Model Seven 
Murder Rate 
Model Eight 
Forcible Rape 
Rate 
% of Prisoners in 
Private Prisons 
 
0.752 1.571 0.028 0.143 
(0.318)* (0.580)* (0.013) (0.055)* 
1980 (Base Year) 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1981 -2.576 -8.924 -0.524 -1.465 
 (3.530) (5.535) (0.407) (0.719) 
1982 -13.412 -11.529 -1.335 -3.429 
 (5.875)* (10.538) (0.369)** (0.836)** 
1983 -31.347 -21.276 -2.400 -4.176 
 (7.145)** (9.708)* (0.386)** (1.035)** 
1984 -36.490 -11.055 -2.547 -2.434 
 (7.004)** (8.523) (0.411)** (1.483) 
1985 -31.382 2.270 -2.413 -1.855 
 (7.244)** (8.314) (0.415)** (1.509) 
1986 -14.365 28.654 -1.888 -1.422 
 (8.512) (11.103)* (0.321)** (1.482) 
1987 -25.789 21.922 -2.407 -2.102 
 (8.543)** (11.760) (0.399)** (1.566) 
1988 -22.248 40.163 -2.265 -2.482 
 (10.709) (13.114)** (0.396)** (1.692) 
1989 -18.627 53.715 -2.497 -1.158 
 (11.407) (13.962)** (0.396)** (2.088) 
1990 -5.663 96.808 -1.824 2.430 
 (11.373) (17.794)** (0.443)** (1.947) 
1991 4.480 108.153 -1.575 2.765 
 (11.594) (19.997)** (0.421)** (2.289) 
1992 1.969 120.818 -1.914 4.471 
 (9.429) (23.177)** (0.534)** (2.380) 
1993 -0.748 125.791 -1.807 3.960 
 (9.189) (24.964)** (0.628)* (3.306) 
1994 -9.759 112.161 -1.871 1.853 
 (8.768) (22.551)** (0.652)* (3.271) 
1995 -12.594 106.026 -1.933 -0.060 
 (9.514) (21.857)** (0.763)* (3.256) 
1996 -21.692 71.782 -2.899 -0.861 
 (11.266) (22.652)** (0.774)** (3.105) 
1997 -32.534 57.047 -3.571 -1.834 
 (13.193)* (22.164)* (0.842)** (3.281) 
1998 -52.483 42.777 -4.172 -2.818 
 (14.716)** (22.584) (0.811)** (3.351) 
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1999 -66.194 15.775 -4.649 -5.233 
 (16.326)** (22.099) (0.832)** (3.383) 
2000 -70.825 7.625 -5.067 -6.301 
 (16.575)** (20.042) (0.794)** (3.390) 
2001 -62.615 9.974 -5.093 -6.914 
 (16.793)** (22.917) (0.869)** (3.420) 
2002 -66.630 5.687 -4.951 -4.947 
 (16.340)** (22.347) (0.824)** (3.639) 
2003 -69.844 -5.982 -4.882 -6.031 
 (16.704)** (22.254) (0.822)** (3.579) 
2004 -74.046 -9.971 -4.906 -5.180 
 (17.170)** (23.121) (0.816)** (3.823) 
2005 -72.581 -9.365 -5.147 -5.846 
 (17.625)** (24.549) (0.838)** (3.926) 
2006 -64.589 -0.105 -4.854 -5.652 
 (16.720)** (26.378) (0.851)** (3.923) 
2007 -64.439 -7.371 -4.652 -6.594 
 (17.000)** (27.080) (0.894)** (4.122) 
2008 -68.742 -21.786 -5.169 -7.844 
 (17.619)** (26.293) (0.862)** (4.138) 
2009 -80.497 -37.082 -5.357 -8.478 
 (18.363)** (26.531) (0.888)** (4.093) 
2010 -93.984 -52.285 -5.958 -10.278 
 (19.479)** (26.284) (0.880)** (3.982)* 
2011 -96.756 -62.786 -5.878 -10.722 
 (20.134)** (27.212)* (0.930)** (4.034)* 
2012 -97.165 -64.229 -5.988 -11.753 
 (20.317)** (28.518)* (0.913)** (4.066)* 
Constant 174.424 280.535 10.029 38.941 
 (8.179)** (12.953)** (0.513)** (2.156)** 
R2 0.46 0.44 0.56 0.28 
N 561 561 561 561 *!p<0.05;!**!p<0.01!
 !  
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